Consumption Externalities, Rental Markets and Purchase Clubs. by Suzanne Scotchmer
DISCUSSION PAPERS 
Institute of Economics  
University of Copenhagen 
 
Papers by Participants in 















Studiestræde 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen K., Denmark 





Birgit Grodal Symposium 
Topics in Mathematical Economics 
 
 
The participants in a September 2002 Workshop  on 
Topics in Mathematical Economics in honor of Birgit 
Grodal decided to have a series of papers appear on Birgit 
Grodal's 60'th birthday, June 24, 2003.  
The Institute of Economics suggested that the papers 
became Discussion Papers from the Institute. 
The editor of Economic Theory offered to consider the 
papers for a special Festschrift issue of the journal with 
Karl Vind as Guest Editor. 
This paper is one of the many papers sent to the 
Discussion Paper series.  
Most of these papers will later also be published in a 




Troels Østergaard Sørensen                           Karl Vind 





Rental Markets and Purchase Clubs
Suzanne Scotchmer





revised May 24, 2003
Abstract A premise of general equilibrium theory is that private goods are
rival. Nevertheless, many private goods are shared, e.g., through barter, through
co-ownership, or simply because one person’s consumption a¤ects another person’s
wellbeing. We analyze consumption externalities from the perspective of club theory,
and argue that, provided consumption externalities are limited in scope, they can be
internalized through membership fees to groups. Our main applications are to rental
ma rket s a nd “p urcha s e cl ubs ” i n whi ch memb ers sh are t he g o o ds t ha t t he y have
individually purchased.
This paper was supported by the U.C., Berkeley Committee on Research, and the
Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen. I am grateful to Birgit Grodal for
her collaboration on the theory that underlies this paper, and for her helpful and mo-
tivating comments about these particular extensions. I also thank Hal Varian, Doug
Lichtman, Steve Goldman and members of the Berkeley Microeconomics Seminar for
discussion.
01I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the main distinctions in microeconomics is between private goods, which are
rival, and public goods, which are nonrival. Rivalness means that only one agent
bene…ts from or is harmed by consumption of the good. Nonrivalness means that a
second agent can consume the good simultaneously, without impinging on the bene…ts
received by the buyer.
Club theory mutes this sharp distinction. The essential idea in club theory is
that, by sharing a club, members share its services and share externalities conferred
by the attributes or activities of the club’s members. When purchasing memberships,
members anticipate the full suite of externalities, which are therefore internalized,
since they have the option not to join. The club model has wide-ranging applicabil-
ity, comprising educational opportunities, …rms, schools, social activities, academic
departments, and many other human activities that take place in groups. For a
wide-ranging set of examples, see Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer and Zame (EGSZ
1999, 2001, 2003), and for how these idea relate to the more traditional literature on
local public goods, see Scotchmer (2002).
An important type of nonrivalness is consumption externalities, or the notion that
one agent’s consumption of private goods can a¤ect other agents’ wellbeings. If
consumption activities confer uncompensated externalities, an equilibrium will not
generally be e¢cient; that is, the …rst welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory
does not hold.
Nevertheless, consumption externalities are pervasive. When someone buys a
dog that barks, all the neighbors su¤er. When a college roommate cooks something
smelly for dinner, the other roommates have to go out. When a roommate subscribes
to your favorite magazine, you are pleased. When your best friend buys an Armani
suit in your size, or better yet a country house, you contemplate the possibility of
sharing it.
1These consumption externalities can be internalized. As long as the consumption
externalities are limited to a …nite group of agents which can be conceived as a
club, pricing of memberships creates an opportunity to internalize the consumption
externalities.
The question is how to model the sharing of private goods, and provide for pricing.
Di¤erent goods involve di¤erent protocols for sharing. Goods like power tools, ski
equipment and sometimes cars are used only occasionally by each user: As long as
the transactions costs are not exorbitant, it is more e¢cient to keep the good in
use than to let it sit idle. Nevertheless, sharing may be inconvenient. If the good
cannot be used simultaneously, then there must be a protocol for resolving con‡icts
or scheduling use. We would expect prices to re‡ect the priority that a member gets,
or the overall inconvenience of the use, as measured, for example, by the ratio of total
use to total goods.
For some goods there is rather little inconvenience due to sharing. Computer
software and sometimes digital content (music, movies) can be used simultaneously
when installed simultaneously on di¤erent users’ computers. The only inconvenience
is in keeping the sharing group small enough to avoid detection, since simultaneous
use will typically violate the seller’s intellectual property rights.
For shared consumption that generates pleasure for one person and discomfort for
another, such as playing Beatles tunes at midnight or smoking cigarettes, the protocol
of sharing might be to prohibit use at certain hours or in certain places.
The purpose of this paper is to show how shared consumption (or “externali-
ties”) can be accommodated within the club model, and also to show how the club
model subsumes ordinary market solutions to sharing, such as rental markets. The
technology of sharing will determine how the club model must be adapted or applied.
Section 2 reprises the group-formation model of EGSZ (2003). Section 3 gives
informal examples, showing how group formation can internalize consumption exter-
nalities. We discuss four ways that the club model can be adapted to accommo-
2date sharing, the appropriate one depending on the technology of sharing. Section
4 addresses purchase clubs, where the purchased (shared) goods are assumed to be
proprietary. In this section, the club model is extended to allow proprietary pricing
of private goods. Section 5 shows that club theory leads to a useful model of rental
markets, with peak and o¤-peak pricing, and prices that re‡ect the inconvenience of
competing with other users.
2 A Reprise of the Club Model
In order to understand the special cases and extensions developed in the next sections,
it is necessary to refer to the full group-formation or club model, which is described
here. Readers who are familiar with the EGSZ (2003) can skip to the next section.
Groups are described by an exogenous set of grouptypes.
To de…ne grouptypes, let ­ be an abstract, …nite set of membership characteristics,
and let ¡ be an abstract, …nite set of activities.
A grouptype is a triple (¼;°;y) consisting of a pro…le ¼ : ­ ! Z+ = f0;1;:::g,
an activity ° 2 ¡; and a vector of private goods y 2< N. The negative elements of y
represent net inputs, and the positive elements represent net outputs.
For ! 2 ­, ¼(!) represents the number of members of the group having the
membership characteristic !. A membership characteristic speci…es the role in the
grouptype that the membership entails (such as teacher or student), as well as the
personal qualities required for the membership, including attributes such as intel-
ligence, cooperativeness, personal habits, computer skills, the ability to teach, and
managerial skills. The personal attributes can either be inherent or acquired. In
the applications of Sections 4 and 5, the membership characteristics are respectively
contributions of a good that will be shared by members or the usage of a rental good.
In each case it is natural to model the contributions as real numbers (which must be
3chosen, however, from a …nite set), although in general no such structure is imposed
on ­:
We take as given a …nite set of possible grouptypes G = f(¼;°;y)g.
A membership is an opening in a particular grouptype for an agent of a particular
membership characteristic; i.e., (!;(¼;°;y)) such that (¼;°;y) 2Gand ¼(!) ¸ 1:
We write M for the (…nite) set of memberships.
Each agent may choose many memberships in groups or none. A membership
list is a function ` : M!f 0;1;:::g,w h e r e`((!;(¼;°;y))) speci…es the number of
memberships of type (!;(¼;°;y)).
The set of agents is a nonatomic measure space (A;F;¸).T h a ti s ,A is a set, F is
a ¾-algebra of subsets of A and ¸ is a non-atomic measure on F with ¸(A) < 1.A
c o m p l e t ed e s c r i p t i o no fa na g e n ta 2 A consists of a consumption set, an endowment
of private goods and a utility function.
Agent a’s consumption set Xa speci…es the feasible bundles of private goods and
feasible lists of memberships that the agent may choose. Private-goods consumption
is non-negative. For many examples, the consumption set of an agent a can be
written Xa = <N
+ £Lists(a) where Lists(a) is a …nite set of lists, but in other cases,
the consumption set is restricted by the list. As discussed in the next section, this
may be natural with consumption externalities. We impose a bound M on how many
memberships an agent can consume.
Feasibility will typically impose many restrictions, since memberships are not
restricted in any other way. For example, the restrictions would prevent an agent
from choosing memberships that are impossible, such as being simultaneously a sumo
wrestler and a member of a ballet club.
Agent a’s endowment is (ea;0) 2 Xa. Agents are endowed with private goods but
not with group memberships.
4Agent a’s utility function ua : Xa !<is de…ned over private goods consumptions
and lists of group membership. For each ` 2 Lists(a), ua(¢;`) is continuous and
strictly monotone ; i.e., utility is strictly increasing in private goods consumption.




A state speci…es choices of private goods and lists of group memberships for each
agent. Feasibility of a state of the economy entails consistent matching of agents and
feasible consumptions.
Consistent matching of agents will be expressed in terms of an aggregate member-
ship vector ¹ ¹ 2< M, representing the total number of memberships of each type cho-
sen by the agents collectively. We say that an aggregate membership vector ¹ ¹ 2< M
is consistent if for every qrouptype (¼;°;y) 2G ,t h e r ei sar e a ln u m b e r®(¼;°;y);
representing the “number” (measure) of groups of type (¼;°;y); such that
¹ ¹(!;(¼;°;y)) = ®(¼;°;y)¼(!)
for each ! 2 ­. Consistency means that there are no partially …lled groups (except
possibly for choices by a set of agents with measure zero).
The state (x;¹) is feasible if it satis…es the following requirements:
















(iii) Consistency The aggregate vector of memberships
R
A ¹a d¸(a) is consistent.
Condition (ii) means that private consumption plus private expenditures on the
costs of acquiring characteristics do not exceed endowments plus net production.
5Associated with a feasible state is a collection f®(¼;°;y)j(¼;°;y) 2G gwhich de-
scribes the measures of the groups of various types. Because the set of agents is a
continuum, there will either be “no” groups of a given type (¼;°;y) in a feasible state
of the economy, ®(¼;°;y)=0 ; or there will be “many” (indeed, in…nitely many)
groups of this type, ®(¼;°;y) > 0. Because members of a group care only about the
membership characteristics of other members, and not about their identities, it is not
necessary to identify the agents belonging to each individual club.
Both private goods and group memberships are priced, so prices (p;q) lie in <N
+ £
<M; p is the vector of prices for private goods and q is the vector of prices for
group memberships. Prices of group memberships may be positive, negative or zero.
Membership prices have di¤erent interpretations in di¤erent examples. They may be
required to pay for the infrastructure of the group or its activities, to remunerate a
member for his opportunity cost of membership, in particular, wages, or may, when
negative, be required to compensate a member for membership when his presence
confers positive externalities on other members. A negative price means that he
is paid to be a member. In Section 4 below, a negative price might mean that the
member of a purchase club is partially reimbursed by other members for the purchases
he contributes.
A group equilibrium consists of a feasible state (x;¹) and prices (p;q) 2< N
+ £
<M;p6=0such that
(1) Budget feasibility for agents For almost all a 2 A,
(p;q) ¢ (xa;¹ a) · p ¢ ea














(3) Budget balance for grouptypes For each (¼;°;y) 2G :
X
!2­
¼(!) q(!;(¼;°;y)) + p ¢ y =0
6Thus, at an equilibrium individuals optimize subject to their budget constraints
and the sum of membership prices in a given grouptype is exactly equal to the net
cost or surplus generated by the use or production of private goods, p ¢ y:
EGSZ (2003) prove the …rst welfare theorem for this model as well as core/competitive
equivalence. (Or, more accurately, they point out that the theorems of EGSZ (1999)
can be adapted for the (2003) elaboration of the (1999) model.)
In the examples of the EGSZ papers, the characteristics ­ generally represent
quali…cations needed to perform certain functions within groups, such as teaching or
dancing, or simply conferring externalities. The externalities within groups generally
arise from these characteristics. However, as discussed in the introduction, another
type of externality that can arise within groups comes from the consumption bundles
of private goods that are chosen by the group members. We now discuss how the
model can be extended to internalize consumption externalities.
3 Consumption Externalities
The group formation model can accommodate consumption externalities (or shared
consumption) by using the following adaptations:
² Using consumption sets, consumption of private goods can be restricted in a
way that depends on group memberships.
² The activity vector ° can specify how private goods, modeled in y as inputs;
are shared.
² The membership characteristic can obligate the member for certain purchases
that must be shared with other members, with the terms of sharing speci…ed
by °:
7² The membership characteristic can entitle the member to certain speci…ed usage
of the shared good.
Some examples follow.
Example 1. Suppose that a group of friends share a house. Their joint consump-
tion of the house is a type of club, (¼;°;y), and their enjoyment of it depends on the
consumption and activities of the members, such as whether they throw late-night
parties, play Beatles tunes, or smoke cigarettes. A shared house which seeks to avoid
these consumption activities, and hence to avoid the consumption externalities, can
be described by the following clubtype: The input/output vector y consists of the
house. The activity ° consists of a commitment that no member shall listen to Bea-
tles tunes at midnight. Alternatively, the membership characteristic ! may commit
the member not to play Beatles tunes. The consumption set may prohibit a member
of such a household from purchasing cigarettes.
If households (families) could form endogenously rather than being …xed in ad-
vance, then this example is closely related to the household consumption model of
Gersbach and Haller (2001). They study exogenously formed households whose
members care about the consumption vectors of all other members. The individual
consumption vectors are a joint decision of the household, using a combined budget
constraint. In the club model, consumption of private goods is the private decision
of the member, but consumption can be constrained in the consumption set in a way
that depends on memberships. In the club model, the transfers are explicit through
positive and negative membership fees. In the Gersbach and Haller model, the trans-
fers among household members are implicit in the combined budget constraint.
Example 2. Suppose that a group of students share a house, and divide tasks
in advance, so that someone must be the cook, someone must take out the garbage,
someone must bring sports equipment, and someone who is smart and versatile will
do their collective homework. These commitments could be built into the member-
ship characteristics !. Some characteristics, like being the cook, could be acquired
8skills, and others, like doing all their homeworks, require innate abilities and also
learned skills. Not everyone could feasibly choose such a membership. If the cook
requires cookbooks, those could be part of the input vector y, or they could be con-
sidered an investment required to have the “cook” membership. That is, the cook’s
consumption set must specify that he consumes cookbooks. Bringing the cookbooks
will presumably cause him to have a lower membership price in equilibrium than if
the cookbooks were provided as an input in y. Similarly, the person who contributes
the sports equipment must presumably invest in it, and his membership price should
re‡ect this investment. If di¤erent members bring di¤erent sports equipment, their
personal characteristics will re‡ect their contributions. The activity ° must specify
the organizational arrangements under which they decide how to ration the sports
equipment.
Example 3. The friends may band together for the dedicated purpose of sharing
music or software CD’s, in order to avoid purchasing duplicate copies. This is a
purchase club, described in Section 4. We model purchase clubs as shared usage of
goods that are not subject to congestion, but for which the sharing group is limited
in size. The motivation is shared purchases of digital products that can be installed
separately on several computers and used simultaneously. In fact, if there are no
congestion costs, the digital product could be shared by an unboundedly large group
of people. We assume that sharing on this scale cannot happen, because it would
be detected and stopped by the copyright holder. Because sharing violates license
terms, it usually takes the form that friends buy software or content in the realization
that they will barter the use of it for a similar digital product that someone else has
bought.
Since CD’s are sold at proprietary prices, which should be taken as a datum of the
economy, the shared CD’s cannot be modeled in the input vector y: Instead we model
the contributions of proprietary goods in the membership characteristic !: If there is
a sharing protocol to be worked out, it could be modeled in °.I f t h e s h a r i n g p r o t o c o l
involves priorities, the priorities could be speci…ed in the membership characteristic,
along with the contributions.
9Example 4. Suppose that the shared good is partially rival, in the sense that
intense use causes con‡ict or congestion that must be resolved. In that case, we
would expect membership prices to depend on both the member’s intensity of use,
the overall usage, and perhaps other aspects that re‡ect when demand is likely to
be high. Here we are thinking of, for example, a sailboat. The demand to use
sailboats is mostly on weekends and summer days. The price during the afternoon on
a balmy Saturday in August might have to be very high in order to avoid other types
of rationing, while the price for an early morning sail on a Tuesday in January might
have to be very low in order to keep the sailboat in use. Some group types commit
to overall low usage, so that a sailboat is more likely to be free when the user wants
it.
Here the sharing protocol can be speci…ed by the organizational structure or ac-
tivity, °; for example, “…rst come …rst served,” or “call ahead for a reservation,” and
° could also specify an overall level of usage. The membership characteristic ! could
specify a particular member’s intensity of usage, perhaps depending on whether the
usage is peak or o¤-peak. The vector y represents the input vector of shared goods
themselves.
This example is developed in Section 5, where we link it to the more standard
m o d e lo fr e n t a lm a r k e t s .
4 Purchase Clubs
The most straightforward way to model shared purchases is to model them as inputs
in the input/output vector y: However that is not consistent with the model unless the
shared goods are competitively supplied. The application below is to shared goods
that are proprietary, with prices given as a datum of the economy. We therefore give
a slight modi…cation to the EGSZ model, in which contributions of goods purchased
at proprietary prices are modeled as membership characteristics.
10Copyright owners have argued for many years that their pro…ts are undermined
when users share. Their calculation of the loss usually involves the assumption that
every unauthorized user would otherwise purchase a legitimate copy at the prevailing
price. Both common sense and the economics literature challenge this view. What is
argued in the literature (Besen and Kirby (1989), Varian (2000), Bakos, Brynjolfsson
and Lichtman (1999)) is that proprietors will anticipate the sharing behavior, and set
di¤erent prices if the good is sold to individual users than if sold to users who are
expected to share it. These papers argue, somewhat provocatively, that sharing may
actually increase the proprietor’s pro…t. We revisit this question, using a variant of
the club model that allows for proprietary pricing.
Before presenting the model, we begin with an extended example. The example
and theorem that follow are provided for a substantive purpose as well as an illus-
trative one. The example shows that whether sharing enhances pro…t depends on
the groups that form. The theorem that follows relies on the main characterization
of a group equilibrium, which is that groups will form in a way that is collectively
e¢cient – e¢cient for the buyers, that is. Group formation that is e¢cient for the
buyers is probably not e¢cient for the sellers. Indeed, this is more or less what
the theorem shows. In the example, the sellers’ pro…ts may be enhanced if group
formation is, for example, random, but pro…t will not be enhanced if group formation
is systematic in some way that serves the interests of the buyers. The theorem shows
that the pro…t available to the sellers is exactly the same with sharing of purchases as
without, provided the purchase groups form e¢ciently in equilibrium, and the selling
price can depend on the size of the group.
T h i sr e s u l tw o u l dn o ts u r v i v ei nt h ef o r mg i v e ni ft h es h a r e dg o o d si n v o l v e d
marginal costs of supply, as sharing would then reduce industry costs, and the pro-
prietor would presumably share in the bene…ts. This is the focus of the related work
by Besen and Kirby (1989) and Varian (2000).
Instead of assuming that consumers form di¤erent sharing groups for di¤erent
d i g i t a lc o n t e n t ,a si nB B L ,w eg i v eam o d e li nw h i c hag r o u pm a ys h a r es e v e r a l
11products instead of one. This shift in focus gives more ‡exibility in how we can think
of members of a group making side payments. If several products are involved, one
can think of the members as contributing purchases, and trading the use of their
individually owned products. If only one product is involved, explicit side payments
are required.
4.1 Purchase Clubs: An Example in Three Parts
We will consider purchase clubs that share CD’s of two kinds, classical and jazz.
In the three subparts to this example, the willingness to pay (WTP) for these two
types of CD are positively correlated, negatively correlated and uncorrelated “within”
individuals. Positive (negative) correlation means that individuals with high WTP
for classical CDs would have high (low) WTP for jazz. No correlation means that
the WTP for one type of music is uninformative as to the agent’s WTP for the other.
Assume that for each CD, half the population has WTP a and the other half has
WTP x; x < a: We will assume that 3
8(a + x) > 1
2a and 3
8(a + x) >x : How the
willingnesses to pay are distributed among the agents will depend on whether their
willingnesses to pay for jazz and classical are negatively, positively or not correlated.
Our benchmark will be the pro…tability of selling separately to single buyers. At
price p = a, half the agents buy, so per-person pro…t is a
2 for each CD. At p = x
everyone buys, so the expected pro…t per person is x. Pro…t cannot be improved
over maxfa
2;xg by selling at any price between x and a: We compare this benchmark
with a situation where sharing groups of size 2 can form. In each subcase, we work
out the pro…t opportunities with randomly matched groups and homogeneous groups,
and compare with the pro…t available by selling to single buyers.
The “taste spaces” in the …rst and second special cases (positive and negative
correlation) contain two types of WTP fv1;v 2g, and the “taste space” in the third
special case (independence) contains four types of WTP, fv1;v 2;v 3;v 4g.I ne a c hc a s e ,
the taste vectors are equally represented in the population. Each taste vector speci…es
12a WTP for each type of CD. We …rst describe the aggregate willingnesses to pay of
the groups that form, and, for the case that groups form randomly, the probabilities.
For each subcase, we work out the pro…t opportunities at each price, and conclude
at the end that random matching may improve pro…t opportunities, as compared to






If the groups of size 2 form randomly, there will be three types of groups, f(2;0);(0;2);(1;1)g
with the following willingnesses to pay:
Group WTP’s with random matching
probability 1/4 1/2 1/4
group type (2;0) (1;1)( 0 ;2)
WTP classical a + aa + xx + x
WTP jazz a + aa + xx + x
Pro…ts with randomly matched groups
price pro…t per person per CD




p = a + x 1
2
3
4(a + x)= 3 ( a + x)=8
p =2 xx
Under the conditions on the parameters a and x that we speci…ed, the most
pro…table price is p = a + x.
If homogeneous groups form instead of random matching, there will be equal
numbers of groups f(0;2);(2;0)g: These groups have WTP (2a;2a) and (2x;2x)
respectively.
13Pro…ts with homogeneous groups
price pro…t per person per CD which groups buy
p =2 a 1
2
1
22a = a=2( 2 ;0)
p = a + x 1
2
1
2(a + x)=( a + x)=4( 2 ;0)






Group WTP’s with random matching
probability 1/4 1/2 1/4
group type (2;0) (1;1)( 0 ;2)
WTP classical a + aa + xx + x
WTP jazz x + xa + xa + a
Pro…ts with random matching
price to group pro…t per person per CD




p = a + x 1
2
3
4(a + x)= 3 ( a + x)=8
p =2 xx
Pro…ts with homogeneous groups
price to group pro…t per person per CD which groups buy
p =2 a 1
2
1
22a = a=2( 2 ;0)
p = a + x 1
2
1
2(a + x)=( a + x)=4( 2 ;0)
p =2 xx (2;0);(0;2)
14NO WITHIN-PERSON CORRELATION
Tastes (WTP)
v1 v2 v3 v4
WTP classical aaxx
WTP jazz axax





































Pro…ts with random matching
price to group pro…t per person per CD
p =2 aa = 4
p = a + x 3(a + x)=8
p =2 xx
Group WTP’s in homogeneous groups:
probability 1/4 1/4 1/4
group types (2;0;0;0) (0;2;0;0) (0;0;2;0)
WTP classical a + aa + ax + x





15Pro…ts with homogeneous groups
price to group pro…t per person per CD
p =2 aa = 2
p = a + x (a + x)=4
p =2 xx
Perhaps remarkably, the following result holds in all three cases:
Remark 1 Regardless of how willingness to pay for CDs of di¤erent types is corre-
lated within agents, it is more pro…table to sell to randomly assembled groups of size
2 than to single agents. However it is not more pro…table to sell to groups of size 2 if
there is no taste variation within groups.
Hence, whether maximum pro…t increases or decreases when goods are shared
depends on how the agents assemble themselves into groups in equilibrium. This
is addressed in the next subsection. Since every pair of agents in the model below
can have di¤erent tastes, there is no concept of forming groups with homogeneous
tastes. It is not the homogeneity of tastes that erases any pro…t advantage to selling to
groups, but rather the fact that groups form endogenously in a way that is collectively
e¢cient for the members, conditional on the proprietary prices.
4.2 Purchase Clubs: A Theorem
In developing the example, it was convenient to describe the members of groups by
their tastes. However membership prices cannot depend on tastes, as tastes are un-
observable. The membership characteristics will be the contributions of proprietary
goods.
Suppose there are C goods that can be purchased and shared. Proprietors
market these goods at prices r =( r1;:::;rC) > 0: We will compare two situations:
16that the proprietors sell to individual agents, and that the proprietors sell to groups
of maximum size k.
The set ­ will serve various purposes in the model that follows. Most importantly,






+ j z · (Mk;Mk::::Mk)
ª
for a given k>1 where M is the maximum number of memberships in an agent’s
consumption set.
In the example, C =2(jazz and classical), and we assumed that group types
would consume shared goods f(0;0);(0;1),(1;0),(1;1)g: That is, no group purchased
m o r et h a no n eu n i to fe a c hs h a r e dg o o d . T h a ti st h eo u t c o m ew ee x p e c ti fa c c e s st o
a single unit of any shared good is su¢cient as a matter of preferences. However it is
technically convenient to de…ne ­ so that multiple contributions of each shared good
are allowed, and it is technically convenient to allow groups to collectively purchase
more than one unit of each shared good.
A purchase club type (¼;°;y) is a club type such that the membership charac-
teristics ! 2 ­ are interpreted as contributions, and
P
!2­ ¼(!)! is the vector of
goods shared by members of such a group. Recall that, in general, the expression
P
!2­ ¼(!)! has no meaning, as the characteristic ! need not be a number. If a
member chooses a membership for which !>0; then he contributes at least one
shared good, and may be paid in equilibrium by members who choose ! =0 :








17The conditions that de…ne a group equilibrium (Section 2) must be slightly rewritten
to account for the contributions of purchased goods in budget feasibility.
A purchase-club equilibrium at prices r consists of a feasible state (x;¹) and prices
(p;q) 2< N
+ £< M;p6=0such that
(1) Budget feasibility for agents For almost all a 2 A,
(p;q) ¢ (xa;¹ a)+
X
(!;(¼;°;y))2M
¹a(!;(¼;°;y)) r ¢ ! · p ¢ ea









a) >u a(xa;¹ a)









a(!;(¼;°;y)) r ¢ !> p ¢ ea
(3) Budget balance for grouptypes For each (¼;°;y) 2G :
X
!2­
¼(!) q(!;(¼;°;y)) + p ¢ y =0
We will say that, for an arbitrary list `; a consumption bundle (x;`) is budget-
feasible for a particular agent a 2 A if condition (1) holds for (x;`) and (x;`) 2 Xa:
For simplicity, we shall assume there is a single private good, the numeraire, and
shall refer to equilibrium as (x;¹);q:
Although it is not necessary in general, we will specialize the model to isolate the
points of interest. Let the set ¡ be a singleton, specifying that members will share
their purchases, so that we can suppress the activity ° 2 ¡ in the description of the
group type. Let y =0 ,s i n c et h es h a r e dg o o d sa r ed e s c r i b e di nt h em e m b e r s h i p
characteristics. Since there is no input/output vector, a group type is only described
18by the pro…le ¼ which describes how many members contribute each vector ! of
shared goods. We will also assume there is an exogenous bound k on the size of
sharing groups, and this is the k in the de…nition of ­: (In the example, k =2 ) .S i n c e
° is a singleton and y =0 , the sets of possible group types and memberships are
G = f¼ : ­ ! Z+ jj ¼j·kg
M = f(!;¼) j ! 2 ­;¼2G g
We will use the notation !` to refer to the consumption of an agent (distinct from












Utility functions ua : Xa !< ; are de…ned by
ua(x;`)=Ua(x;!
`) (2)
where Ua : ~ Xa !<represents utility as a function of the goods themselves, and








(x;z) 2< + £ Z
C
+ j z = !
`; (x;`) 2 Xa
ª
When referring to an equilibrium (x;¹);q, we will say that a goods bundle (x;!) is
budget-feasible for a 2 A if ! = !` for some budget-feasible (x;`) 2 Xa:
A1: Preferences can be de…ned as in (2), where for all a 2 A; (i) Ua(¢;z) is
increasing in the …rst argument at each z 2 ­; and (ii) for each x ¸ 0; if z 62 ­,t h e n
there exists z0 2 ­;z 0 <z ;1 such that Ua (x; z0) ¸ Ua (x; z):
Part (ii) of this assumption is satis…ed if consumers are just as well o¤ consuming
Mk units of any shared good (or any other number less than Mk) as any larger
number of units. If members of each group can use the shared good simultaneously,
1The notation z0 <zmeans that z0 · z and z0
i <z i for at least one element i:
19as is the case when they install computer software or digital music separately on all
their computers, we would expect that one unit of each shared good is su¢cient.
The next three claims characterize a purchase-club equilibrium. Claim 2 describes
prices such that, in equilibrium, agents are indi¤erent as to which membership they
have in a group type that is used in equilibrium. Di¤erent memberships in a given
group type require di¤erent contributions. Members who contribute shared goods
pay low prices (perhaps negative prices), and members who contribute no shared
goods pay high prices, to just an extent that they are indi¤erent.
Claim 2 Suppose that A1 holds. Let (x;¹);qbe a purchase-club equilibrium at prices
r>0.T h e n







¼(!)! ¡ r ¢ ! (3)
(ii) If group type ¼ is used in equilibrium (®(¼) > 0), q satis…es (3) with equality for
all memberships in that group type.
(iii) If group type ¼ is used in equilibrium and ¼(!1);¼(!2) > 0; then for all a 2 A







Proof: (i) If (3) holds with equality, budget balance is satis…ed. (Multiply both
sides of (3) by ¼(!) and sum on !:) If (3) does not hold with equality; then by budget
balance, (3) holds as an inequality for at least one membership in a given grouptype
¼.














¼(!)! ¡ r ¢ !2
20where ¼(!1);¼(!2) > 0:
An agent’s total payments when he chooses a membership are the cost of the
contributions plus the membership fee, q(!;¼)+r ¢ !: Since all memberships in a
given group type ¼ give access to the same shared goods
P
!2­ ¼(!)!; every agent is
better o¤ buying a membership in such a group type that reduces the total payments,
namely (!2;¼) instead of (!1;¼). This is a contradiction, since ¼(!1) > 0:
(iii) follows from (ii). ¤
Claim 3 Suppose that A1 holds. Let (x;¹);qbe a purchase-club equilibrium at prices
r>0.L e t f!¹aja 2 Ag be the consumptions of shared goods de…ned by (1). Then
(i) !¹a 2 ­ for almost every a 2 A.
(ii) If the grouptype ¼ is used in equilibrium (®(¼)>0), then j¼j = k.
(iii) For almost every a 2 A; the consumption of private goods satis…es





Proof: For a given ! 2 ­; there is a list ` 2 Lists such that !` = ! and the





` ¸ x ¸ 0 (5)
To construct `; let ¼ be a group type such that j¼j = k and !` = ! =
P
!02­ ¼(!0)!0:
Construct ` with a single membership in this grouptype, namely a membership for
which (3) holds. Then (5) implies budget feasibility:



























`(!;¼)[r ¢ ! + q(!;¼)]
21Using Claim 2(ii); equilibrium consumption can be characterized as follows for
almost every a 2 A :
xa = ea ¡
X
(!;¼)2M

























(i) Suppose !¹a 62 ­ for a set of agents of positive measure, say ¹ A µ A.F o r e a c h
such a 2 ¹ A; by A1 there exists !0 2 ­;! 0 <! ¹a; such that Ua(xa;! ¹a) · Ua(xa;!0).
Using (6), 0 · xa · ea¡ r
k¢!¹a <e a¡ r
k ¢!0: Using (5), there is a list ` with associated
consumption !` = !0 such that (xa;`) 2 Xa is budget feasible. Further, there is a
budget-feasible (x;`) 2 Xa such that ea ¡ r
k ¢ !0 ¸ x>x a.B u t t h e nUa(xa;! ¹a) ·
Ua(xa;! 0) <U a(x;!0); which contradicts the e¢ciency of equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose that there is a group type ¼ such that j¼j <kand ®(¼) > 0: Let
¹ A µ A be the set of agents with memberships in this grouptype ¼. Using (i), we can
assume without loss of generality that for each a 2 ¹ A; !¹a 2 ­: Since (6) holds as
a strict inequality, ea ¡ r
k ¢ !¹a >x a ¸ 0: Using (5), there is a list ` with a single
membership in a club of type ¼, j¼j = k; such that !` = !¹a. (xa;! `) is budget
feasible because ea ¡ r
k ¢ !` = ea ¡ r
k ¢ !¹a >x a ¸ 0: Further, for every a 2 ¹ A;





;e a ¡ r
k ¢ !` ¸ x`
a >x a; such that Ua(x`
a;!`)=
Ua(x`
a;! ¹a) >U a(xa;! ¹a), which contradicts the e¢ciency of equilibrium.
(iii) But if j¼j = k;then, using Claim 2(ii), xa = ea¡
P
(!;¼)2M ¹a(!;¼)[r ¢ ! + q(!;¼)]
= ea ¡ r
jkj ¢ !¹a so (4) holds. ¤
Our objective is to compare the group equilibrium at prices r t oam a r k e ti n
which proprietors sell to individual agents at prices r=k: To study the market with
individual buyers, we de…ne the agents’ demand sets as follows. For each a 2 A and
22r>0
D
a(r)=ff 2 ­ j ea ¡ r ¢ f ¸ 0 and for all ! 2 ­; either (7)
Ua (ea ¡ r ¢ f; f) ¸ Ua (ea ¡ r ¢ !; !) or ea ¡ r ¢ !<0g
By A1, there is no loss of generality in restricting to demand vectors in ­:
Aggregate demand is the integral of a selection from individual demand sets. A
demand selection at prices r is an integrable function f : A ! ­ such that f(a) 2




f(a)d¸(a) j f is a demand selection at prices r
¾
The following Claim and Proposition hold under the assumpton that at each r>0;
there is an integrable demand selection. (If there is no notion of aggregate demand,
the proposition has no meaning.)
Claim 4 Suppose that A1 holds. Let (x;¹);qbe a purchase-club equilibrium at prices
r>0; and let f!¹aga2A be the associated consumptions of shared goods: Then (8)









for all ! 2 ­ (8)
Proof: Suppose the inequality (8) does not hold for a set of agents of positive






¹a) for all a 2 A (9)
with strict inequality for a 2 ¹ A. This contradicts that the equilibrium (x;¹) is
e¢cient.
23Let f be a demand selection at prices r
k. Using the de…nition of a demand selection
and Claim 3(i), the following holds for all a 2 A and holds with strict inequality for



















Therefore we can complete the proof by constructing a feasible state (~ x; ~ ¹) such
that for each a 2 A; !~ ¹a = f(a); ~ xa = ea ¡ r
k ¢ f(a).
For each ¹ ! 2 ­; let A¹ ! ´f a 2 A j f(a)=¹ !g.S u p p o s e t h a t A¹ ! has positive
measure. (If A¹ ! has measure zero it is irrelevant.) Assign each a 2 A¹ ! t oas i n g l e
membership, in a group type ¼¹ ! 2Gde…ned as follows. Let ¼¹ !(¹ !)=1;¼(!0)=k¡1;
where !0 =( 0 ;0;::;0); and let ¼¹ ! (!)=0for ! 62 f¹ !;!0g: Then j¼¹ !j = k.F o r
each a 2 ¹ A¹ !; ¹ ! =
P
!2­¼¹ !(!)! = f(a). For the feasible state (~ x; ~ ¹); (9) holds for
all a 2 A, and holds strictly for a 2 ¹ A: This contradicts that (x;¹) is e¢cient, and
therefore contradicts that (x;¹);qis an equilibrium. ¤
The inequality (8) characterizes agents’ consumption of shared goods in a group

















for all ! 2 ­ (11)
which looks very much like the de…nition of the demand correspondence (7) for indi-
vidual purchases at prices r
k. This is the basis of the argument that follows, which says
that proprietors have the same pro…t opportunities in both market circumstances.
A complication, however, is that neither the individual demand correspondence
nor group equilibrium is necessarily unique. Consumers may be indi¤erent between
these equilibria; but the proprietors will not be. Assuming that the proprietors price
above marginal cost, they prefer more sales to fewer. Similarly, the several group
equilibria at prices r will generate the same total utility for agents, but will generate
di¤erent total pro…t for the proprietors.
Our objective below is to prove an “equivalence” from the proprietor’s point of
24view between selling to individuals and selling to groups. We must de…ne a notion
of equivalence that accounts for the problem of multiple equilibria.
We show that, despite the multiple equilibria, the pro…t possibilities are the same
whether the proprietors sell to individuals or to groups. Aggregate sales in the group






¹a(!;¼) !d ¸ (a)
If z represents an aggregate demand vector at prices r=k and !(x;¹) represents
aggregate sales to members of groups in a group equilibrium (x;¹);qat prices r,t h e n
the pro…ts in the two situations are the same if (12) holds. The following proposition
says that there is always an equivalence of that type.
z = k!(x;¹) (12)
Proposition 5 [Pro…t Equivalence] Suppose that A1 holds.
(i) Let (x;¹);q be a purchase-club equilibrium at prices r>0.T h e n k!(x;¹)
2 D(r=k):
(ii) Let z 2 D(r=k) be an aggregate demand vector at prices r=k > 0: Then
there exists a purchase-club equilibrium (x;¹);qat prices r, with aggregate purchases
!(x;¹)=z=k:












¹a(!;¼) !d ¸ (a)=!(x;¹) (13)
2Since (x;¹) is an equilibrium, ¹ is integrable. Hence the sets fa 2 A j ¹a(!;¼)=tg for t =




are also integrable, hence the function de…ned by !¹a is integrable.
25This is because there are k agents consuming every purchased good. Since f!¹aga2A
satisfy (11), they are also a demand selection at prices r
k: Hence k!(x;¹) 2 D(r=k):
(ii) The aggregate demand can be written z =
R
Af(a) d¸(a) for a demand selection
f at prices r
k: For the selection f, we will construct an equilibrium (x;¹);qas in the
p r o o fo fC l a i m4 ,u s i n gp r i c e sq described by (3) with equality. To show that (xa;¹ a)
is optimal for a 2 A; we must show that Ua(xa;!¹a) ¸ Ua(x`
a;! `) for any budget-
feasible (x`
a;`): Due to the choice of q and j¼j·k; any budget-feasible (x`
a;`) 2 Xa
satis…es x`
a · ea ¡ r
k ¢ !`:
Using the constructed (x;¹);q and the de…nition of a demand selection, for each
a 2 A; Ua(xa;! ¹a)=Ua(ea ¡ r
k ¢ f (a);f(a)) ¸ Ua(ea ¡ r
k ¢ !;!) for all ! 2 ­
such that ea ¡ r
k ¢ ! ¸ 0: If !` 2 ­; a budget-feasible (x`
a;`) satis…es Ua(xa;! ¹a) ¸
Ua(ea ¡ r
k ¢ !`;!`) ¸ Ua(x`
a;!`): If !` 62 ­; then by A1 there exists ! 2 ­ such
that Ua(ea ¡ r
k ¢ !`;!) ¸ Ua(ea ¡ r
k ¢ !`;!`): But since ea ¡ r
k ¢ !>e a ¡ r
k ¢ !`;
Ua(ea ¡ r
k ¢ !;!) >U a(ea ¡ r
k ¢ !`;!) ¸ Ua(ea ¡ r
k ¢ !`;! `) ¸ Ua(x`
a;! `): But then
Ua(xa;! ¹a) ¸ Ua(ea ¡ r
k ¢ !;!) >U a(x`
a;!`) for some ! 2 ­: Hence (x;¹);q is a
purchase-club equilibrium at prices r. To complete the proof, notice that z =
R
Af(a)
d¸(a)=k!(x;¹) 2 D(r=k): ¤
5R e n t a l M a r k e t s
Example 4 in Section 3 suggests that the club model can be interpreted as a rental
market. Our objective here is to elaborate that example, and show circumstances in
which sharing groups are equivalent to how we would conceive of a rental market in
ordinary general equilibrium theory.
The easiest way to think of rental markets is that there is an amortized cost of
keeping the rental good continuously in use. The competitive price of using it will
re‡ect this amortized cost. If this is all there is to it, then general equilibrium theory
as conceived by Arrow and Debreu can easily account for rental markets, even if
26demand is not time-invariant. If, for example, there are peak and o¤-peak demand
periods (in the case of sailboats, balmy summer days and dark winter days), then we
might think of rentals in the two periods as jointly produced, but di¤erent, goods.
Price cannot equal “marginal cost” in both periods, since the price in the two periods
will be di¤erent.
We now show how the club model accommodates rental markets, allowing the
quality of the rentals (in the sense of inconvenience due to congestion) to be endoge-
nous, and di¤erentiating prices according to peak and o¤-peak periods.
Pricing in the club model is more ‡exible than in a rental market. Prices in
an ordinary rental market are linear on units of usage, although possibly di¤erent in
peak and o¤-peak periods. We show conditions under which rental prices in a group
equilibrium can also be interpreted as linear prices on usage.
Let elements of ­ represent usage.I n p a r t i c u l a r , f o r … x e d k; represent usage by
­ = f(!p;! o)j!p 2f 0;1;2;::::kg;! o 2f 0;1;2;::::kgg;
where the membership characteristic (!p;!o) 2 ­ represents the number of units of
rental of each type, peak and o¤-peak. As in the model of the previous section, this
model specializes ­ to be a space of numbers rather than an abstract space.
A rental group type is (¼;°;y),w h e r ey represents the rental goods bought in a
competitive market, and ° 2 ¡ speci…es the total usage o¤ered by the rental group
at both peak and o¤peak times. In particular, ¡=
©
f1;2;:::¹ °pg£f 1;2;:::¹ °og
ª
,a n d






¼ : ­ ! Z+ j
X
(!p;!o)2­







What we have in mind are rental groups that o¤er the same rental goods, such as
a single sail boat, else total usage ° 2 ¡ would not be related to congestion in any
27obvious way. We shall therefore assume that all grouptypes have the same input
vector y: We shall thus leave y out of the description of a group type, although it
remains in the budget balance condition for each rental grouptype.3 The feasible set
of grouptypes and memberships are
G = f(¼;°) j ° =( °p;°o) 2 ¡;¼2 ¦(°)g
M = f((!p;! o);(¼;°)) j (!p;! o) 2 ­; (¼;°) 2G g
Let !` =( !`
p;!`
o):¡! Z+£Z+ represent usage associated with the list `.F o r e a c h












`((!p;! o);(¼;^ °)) !o
Consumption sets are constrained in that individual usage has an upper bound:








o (°) · K; each ° 2 ¡
ª
for some positive number K:
The condition under which we can prove that the club equilibrium is equivalent
to a rental market is if utility functions ua : Xa !< ; can be expressed as
ua(x;`)=Ua(x;!
`) (15)
where Ua : ~ Xa !<represents utility as a function of the other private goods and
rental usage, and











We say that a group equilibrium (x;¹);(p;q) is equivalent to equilibrium in a rental
market if there exist rental prices (µp;µ o):¡! R £ R such that, if ` 2 Lists; the
3If the inputs y could vary for each level of service °; all group types used in equilibrium would
be those with the minimum p ¢ y. An alternative formulation would allow preferences to depend
o nu s a g ei ne a c ht y p eo fc l u bc h a r a c t e r i z e db y(°;y) rather than °; so that the combination (°;y)
determines the quality of the rental rather than just °:









= ` ¢ q (16)
The important feature of rental markets is that they impose a restriction on prices.
The membership price q((!p;! o );(¼;°)) will re‡ect the member’s peak usage and
o¤peak usage, as well as the congestion. In the club model, there is no ap r i o r i
restriction that the price q((!p;! o );(¼;°)) can be conceived as a linear price on
usage, and that the linear price is the same as that of other users, scaled by usage.
In a rental market, that is the natural restriction. We now show that all agents pay
a price that is the same linear function of usage, regardless of usage, and regardless
of how they divide usage among di¤erent rental units.
Proposition 6 Suppose that preferences can be expressed as (15). Then for every
group equilibrium (x;¹);(p;q0) there is another group equilibrium (x;¹);(p;q) that is
equivalent to an equilibrium in a rental market.
Proof of Proposition 6: To de…ne the prices (µp;µ o) in the rental market,
we …rst de…ne some distinguished group types that o¤er rentals in individual units,
rather than selling usage in bulk. For each ° 2 ¡,l e t(¼°;°) be a group type such
that ¼°(0;1)=°o;¼ °(1;0) = °p,a n d¼(!p;!o)=0for (!p;! o) = 2f (0;1);(1;0)g: For
example, a membership ((0;1);(¼°;°)) is a single o¤-peak use.
Let (x;¹);(p;q0) be a group equilibrium. To de…ne the prices in the rental market,
for each ° 2 ¡ let
µp(°) = q0((1;0);(¼°;°))
µo(°) = q0((0;1);(¼°;°)) (17)
For the prices (17), we will show that (16) holds for each list that is chosen in
equilibrium by a set of agents of positive measure. However (16) does not necessarily
hold for lists that are not chosen. To guarantee that (16) holds for all lists, we will
29construct another equilibrium (x;¹);(p;q).T h e p r i c e s q0 and q will di¤er only for
memberships in group types that are not used in equilibrium; that is, group types for
which ®(¼;°)=0 : Let
q(!;(¼;°)) = q0(!;(¼;°))
for all ! 2 ­ if ®(¼;°) > 0:
q(!;(¼;°)) = !p q0((1;0);(¼°;°)) + !o q0((0;1);(¼°;°))
for all ! 2 ­ if ®(¼;°)=0
It follows that for each ° 2 ¡
µp(°) = q((1;0);(¼°;°))
µo(°) = q((0;1);(¼°;°))
Claim 7 (x;¹);(p;q) is a group equilibrium. For each list ` 2 Lists which is not
chosen in equilibrium by a set of agents of positive measure, (16) holds for q and µ:
P r o o fo fC l a i m7 : We show that almost every agent’s optimizing choice (xa;¹ a)
is the same under price systems(p;q) and (p;q0), and that (16) holds for q and µ:
Let ` be a list that is not chosen in the equilibrium (x;¹);(p;q0) by any group
of agents with positive measure. For this list and almost all agents a 2 A,t h e r ei s
no (x;`) that is budget feasible at prices q0 and strictly preferred to (xa;¹ a).W e
must show that there is also no (x;`) that is budget-feasible at prices q and strictly
preferred to (xa;¹ a). Suppose to the contrary that there is. But then we can
construct a list `0 and a budget-feasible (x;`0) that is strictly preferred to (xa;¹ a) at
prices q0; which is a contradiction.
To construct the list `0, assign memberships as follows: for each ° 2 ¡;` 0((0;1);(¼°;°)) =
!`
o (°), `0(1;0);(¼°;°)) = !`
p (°). Then the lists ` and `0 provide the same usage
!` = !`0,a n d
` ¢ q = `
0 ¢ q = `
0 ¢ q









(The cost ` ¢ q0 can be greater or smaller than this:)
30It holds that ¹a ¢ q = ¹a ¢ q0 for almost all a 2 A.I f (x;`) is budget-feasible at
prices q and strictly preferred to (xa;¹ a); then (x;`0) is budget feasible at prices q
and strictly preferred to (xa;¹ a); so (x;`0) is budget-feasible at prices q0 and strictly
preferred to (xa;¹ a); which contradicts that (x;¹),(p;q0) is an equilibrium. ¤
We have thus shown that (16) holds for lists ` that are not chosen in equilibrium
by a set of agents of positive measure. We must argue that (16) also holds for lists
that are chosen in the equilibrium (x;¹);(p;q),n a m e l yf¹aja 2 Ag:
Construct a consistent list assignment f~ ¹aja 2 Ag with the same individual us-
age as in the equilibrium lists f¹aja 2 Ag; but in individual units rather than as
aggregated memberships. For each a 2 A; ° 2 ¡; let
~ ¹a((1;0);(¼°;°)) = !
¹a
p (°)
~ ¹a((0;1);(¼°;°)) = !
¹a
o (°)
~ ¹a((!p;! o);(¼;°)) = 0 for all other memberships
Then the following holds by construction for almost all a 2 A:









Since !¹a = !~ ¹a for all a 2 A; the following holds for almost every a 2 A: Otherwise
there would be a budget-feasible (~ xa; ~ ¹a) t h a tw o u l db ep r e f e r r e dt o(xa;¹ a):
¹a ¢ q · ~ ¹a ¢ q (19)
The assignment ~ ¹ is consistent because ¹ is consistent. Since !¹a (°)=!~ ¹a (°)
for each ° 2 ¡ and every a 2 A; the number of groups associated with ~ ¹ is the same
as the number associated ¹; and each has the same cost p ¢ y: Since q balances the
budget for each group type, ¹ and ~ ¹ must generate the same revenue:
Z
A
¹a ¢ qd ¸ (a)=
Z
A
~ ¹a ¢ qd ¸ (a) (20)
31But this proves that (19) cannot hold with strict inequality for a set of agents with
positive measure. Using Claim 7, (18) and (19), which holds with equality for almost
all a 2 A, we can conclude that (16) holds for all lists ` 2 Lists: ¤
5.1 Conclusion
The club model can account for consumption externalities in various ways. By
consumption externalities, we mean that each member of a club cares about the
private-goods consumption of other members. The models above elaborate that idea
by introducing di¤erent technologies of sharing, and showing how the technologies of
sharing can be re‡ected in group types and membership characteristics.
The term “consumption externality” suggests that each agent makes a consump-
tion decision without considering its impact on others. The club model forces him to
consider the impact. Groups that want to avoid negative externalties that arise from
private consumption decisions will have memberships that involve a commitment to
avoid consumption of certain private goods. Groups that want to generate positive
externalities due to private consumption decisions will have membership characteris-
tics that require certain kinds of consumption. These commitments can be built into
feasible consumption sets, which can constrain the consumption of private goods in
a way that is linked to memberships in groups.
The technology of sharing private goods was more precise in what we called pur-
chase clubs and rental clubs. In the case of automobiles, sailboats and other durable
goods which cannot be used simultaneously by all members of a group, the terms
of sharing must be speci…ed in the group type and the membership characteristics.
Nothing requires that congestible durable goods be shared in rental groups rather than
purchase groups; in fact, there is no clear distinction between those two concepts. We
only chose those terms to suggest familiar market institutions, and to give di¤erent
names to models based on di¤erent sharing technologies. The key point is that, if
users care about total congestion as well as their own usage, then membership prices
32must re‡ect both. And membership prices may also re‡ect the externality-producing
private goods that a member brings as part of his membership.
In the purchase-club and rental-club models, we respectively treated proprietary
pricing and congestion costs. Of course proprietary pricing and congestion can be
combined in the same model: Goods that are purchased at proprietary prices can
nevertheless be subject to congestion. A group equilibrium will be e¢cient for
the users conditional on the proprietary prices, but this is a conditional notion of
e¢ciency. Each copy of a proprietary good that is subject to congestion may be used
“too much” in equilibrium, to conserve on paying the proprietary price.
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